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There are key areas of reform within our regulatory structure 
that should be addressed in any effort to strengthen the over-
sight of our financial markets, enhance consumer protection 
and promote market discipline.  Of primary importance is 
addressing too big to fail.  Market participants should under-
stand that large institutions can and will fail and that an ef-
fective resolution mechanism will be uniformly applied to in-
stitutions in a fair, transparent and consistent manner.1 
– FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair, June 17, 2009 
 
  
 * Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law.  I wish to thank my 
colleagues in the American Association of Law Schools (AALS) Financial Institu-
tions Section for thought-provoking scholarship, challenging discussions, and 
collegial encouragement.  I owe particular gratitude to Art Wilmarth, Patricia 
McCoy, Heidi Schooner, Kathleen Keest, Elizabeth Renuart, Elizabeth Schiltz, 
Christopher Peterson, Howell Jackson, and Keith Fisher.  Michele Thaetig, my 
intrepid assistant, has also earned my appreciation and thanks. 
 1. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair Com-
ments on the Obama Administration’s Regulatory Reform Plan (June 17, 2009), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09091.html. 
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“‘Capitalism without failure is like Christianity without hell.  
These institutions not only brewed the Kool-Aid but drank it.  [Some 
of the banks and mortgage companies] were like an arsonist who got 
caught in the house after he set it on fire.’”2 
 
– Warren Buffett, May 4, 2008. 
I. THE CURRENT PROBLEM: A BLANK CHECK FOR ECONOMIC GIANTS 
A.  Identifying “TBTF” 
Financial institutions labeled “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF) are 
those whose insolvency could shake the foundations of the U.S. fi-
nancial system and our economy.  The term “too big to fail” became 
part of our popular vocabulary in the wake of federal bank regula-
tory intervention to prevent the failure of Continental Illinois Na-
tional Bank in 1984.3  After the banking and savings-and-loan crisis 
of the 1980s, the pros and cons of the TBTF policy were extensively 
debated.4  Despite Congressional efforts to limit application of 
TBTF,5 the doctrine has returned with renewed vigor during the cur-
rent crisis.  Responding on an ad hoc basis, federal banking regula-
tors have employed a TBTF policy to prevent what Federal Reserve 
  
 2. Jason Zweig, Buffett Advice: Buy Smart . . . and Low, CNN MONEY, May 6, 
2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/05/05/news/companies/buffet.pm.wrap/in-
dex.htm (alteration in original) (reporting Warren Buffet’s remarks, made at a 
press conference following the Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting). 
 3. See generally 1 DIV. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES—LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE ch. 7 (1997), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/vol1.html; DAVID S. HOLLAND, WHEN 
REGULATION WAS TOO SUCCESSFUL—THE SIXTH DECADE OF DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE: A HISTORY OF THE TROUBLES OF THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY IN THE 
1980S AND EARLY 1990S ch. 4 (1998). 
 4. See, e.g., Economic Implications of the “Too Big to Fail” Policy: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Stabilization of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. & 
Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. (1991); HOLLAND, supra note 3, ch. 4. 
 5. HOLLAND, supra note 3, ch. 4; see also 1 DIV. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, 
supra note 3, at 33–35, 57, 68, 82, 91, 96, 99 (providing viewpoints on “too big to 
fail” from regulators who held office at the time of FDIC’s Continental Illinois 
intervention). 
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Chairman Ben Bernanke saw as potential for the “second Great De-
pression.”6  Once the floodgates opened, Sunday announcements 
concerning bailout deals became the new business-as-usual.   
Assisted transactions involving TBTF entities have included: 
Bear Stearns (investment bank: purchased by JP Morgan Chase in a 
federally brokered transaction, March 16, 2008);7 IndyMac (major 
subprime lender: placed in conservatorship on July 11, 2008, with 
deposits and assets later sold at a discount to OneWest Bank, FSB, 
on March 19, 2009);8 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Government 
Sponsored Entities (GSEs): placed in conservatorship by the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency on September 7, 2008);9 American Inter-
national Group, Inc. (AIG) (insurance conglomerate: received $85 
billion in exchange for government ownership of 79.9% equity stake 
  
 6. “Nothing made me more frustrated than having to intervene in a couple cases 
where wild bets threatened to bring down the financial system. . . . But I was not 
going to be the Federal Reserve chairman who presided over the second Great 
Depression.”  David Goldman, Bernanke: Economy to Bounce Back Stronger, 
CNN MONEY, July 27, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/26/news/economy/ 
bernanke_town_hall (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ben Bernanke at 
a town hall meeting in Kansas City, Missouri on July 26, 2009); see also James J. 
Cramer, Thank Bernanke, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, June 15, 2009, available at 
http://nymag.com/news/businessfinance/bottomline/57177/. 
 7. KATE KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS: THE LAST 72 HOURS OF BEAR STEARNS, 
THE TOUGHEST FIRM ON WALL STREET 181–214 (2009); Andrew Ross Sorkin, In 
Sweeping Move, Fed Backs Buyout and Wall St. Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 
2008, at A1; see Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of 
Federal Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & 
Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets]. 
 8. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Closes Sale of Indymac Federal 
Bank, Pasadena, California (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/ 
news/news/press/2009/pr09042.html; Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 
FDIC Establishes IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB as Successor to IndyMac Bank, 
F.S.B., Pasadena, California (July 11, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/ 
news/news/press/2008/pr08056.html; FDIC, Failed Bank Information, 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/IndyMac.html (last visited Jan. 28, 
2010). 
 9. See Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, In Rescue to Stabilize Lending, 
U.S. Takes Over Mortgage Finance Titans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at A1; 
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Statement by Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on 
Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Mar-
kets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/ 
press/releases/hp1129.htm 
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on September 17, 2008, two days after Lehman Brothers’s similar 
requests for government assistance were denied and Lehman forced 
into bankruptcy);10 Wachovia (one-time fourth-largest U.S. bank, 
heavily involved in subprime lending: purchased by Wells Fargo on 
Oct. 10, 2008, after initially being approved as an assisted purchase 
by Citigroup);11 Merrill Lynch (investment bank: acquired by Bank 
of America in a deal announced on September 15, 2008, and closed 
at year-end 2008, later yielding litigation over executive bonuses 
paid to Merrill executives and not disclosed to Bank of America 
shareholders);12 and Citigroup (once the world’s largest financial 
institution by market value: received repeated bailouts during Fall 
2008 and Spring 2009).13  The Bush administration’s Troubled Asset 
Relief Program of $700 billion and the Obama administration’s Eco-
nomic Stimulus Package of $825 billion have also provided subsi-
dies accruing more to TBTF entities than to smaller community 
banks doing business under a more traditional, less risky business 
model.14  
In contrast to these government-assisted transactions involving 
TBTF entities, federal banking regulators declined to rescue other 
seemingly TBTF entities.  Lehman Brothers, once one of the five 
  
 10. See Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85B Bailout; 
Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1. 
 11. See Colin Barr, Citi Plays the Heavy, CNN MONEY, Oct. 6, 2008, http:// 
money.cnn.com/2008/10/03/news/citi.bailout.heavy.fortune/index.htm; Feds Give 
Green Light to Wells Fargo-Wachovia, NEWSER.COM, Oct. 10, 2008, 
http://www.newser.com/story/39663/feds-give-green-light-to-wells-fargo-
wachovia.html; Following the Bailout Money to Wells Fargo, WCCO, Feb. 9, 
2009, http://wcco.com/national/Wells.Fargo.money.2.931141.html. 
 12. See Liz Rappaport, Lewis Testifies U.S. Urged Silence on Deal, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 23, 2009, at A1 (reporting Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis’s testimony 
under oath to NY Attorney General that then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson 
repeatedly told him that “the U.S. government was committed to ensuring that no 
systemically important financial institution would fail”). 
 13. David Enrich & Deborah Solomon, Citi, U.S. Reach Accord on a Third Bail-
out, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2009, at B1. 
 14. See generally Gretchen Morgenson, The End of Banking as We Know It, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at BU1 (arguing that the business model of financial 
behemoths is over). 
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largest U.S. investment banks,15 filed for bankruptcy on September 
15, 200816—the largest Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in U.S. his-
tory17 and one that “rocked Wall Street.”18  Washington Mutual, an-
other giant financial institution that failed to get a bailout, was closed 
by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) on September 25, 2008, 
with assets subsequently sold by the FDIC as Receiver to JP Morgan 
Chase.19  CIT Group, the nation’s largest small business lender, may 
demonstrate the break point for “not too big to fail” as well as pro-
vide more insight into market reaction when troubled institutions do 
  
 15. As of January 2008, the top five U.S. investment banks were Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley.  See Katy 
Marquardt, FAQ on Investment Banks, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 17, 2008, 
http://www.usnews.com/money/business-economy/articles/2008/03/17/faq-on-
investment-banks.html.  Bear Stearns was acquired by JP Morgan Chase, Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy, Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of America, 
and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted to bank holding companies to 
become eligible for Federal Reserve discount window loans.  Posting of Michael J. 
de la Merced et al. to DealBook, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/ (Sept. 21, 
2008, 21:35).  The approval of the conversion of Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley to bank holding companies has been viewed as “the latest signal by the 
Federal Reserve that it will not let Goldman or Morgan fail.”  Id. 
 16. Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Lehman Files for Bankruptcy, Merrill Sold, AIG 
Seeks Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB122145492097035549.html; Posting of Derek Kravitz to Washington Post In-
vestigations, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/washingtonpostinvestigations/ 
(Sept. 16, 2008, 15:08 EDT). 
 17. Yalman Onaran & Christopher Scinta, Lehman Files Biggest Bankruptcy 
Case as Suitors Balk, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 15, 2008, http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=awh5hRyXkvs4&pid=20601087. 
 18. Changes Rock Wall Street, CNN, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/ 
US/09/15/banks.bigchanges/index.html; Andy Serwer et al., “We Were Looking at 
the Abyss,” FORTUNE, Sept. 28, 2009, at 78, available at http://money.cnn.com/ 
2009/09/08/news/economy/geithner_lehman_bankruptcy.fortune/index.htm. 
 19. Press Release, Office of Thrift Supervision, Washington Mutual acquired by 
JPMorgan Chase (Sept. 25, 2008), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/in-
dex.cfm?p=PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=9c306c81-1e0b-8562-eb0c-
fed5429a3a56; see also Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Government Seizes 
WaMu and Sells Some Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A1.  WaMu was the 
nation’s largest thrift and its failure represents the largest bank failure in U.S. his-
tory.  Id. 
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not get a bailout.20  CIT Group received $2.3 billion in government 
aid in December 2008, but failed to get more during the summer of 
2009.21  These transactions illustrate the arbitrary nature of TBTF22 
and the market uncertainty about which institutions will be bailed 
out, as well as the favoritism and windfall profits generated by sub-
sidized acquisitions.23 
Size is not the sole criterion for TBTF.24  The institutions marked 
for government bailout to prevent failure are described as “too big to 
liquidate”25 and “too interconnected to fail.”26  The Obama admini-
  
 20. CIT bondholders considered various proposals to keep the firm out of formal 
bankruptcy proceedings once it became apparent that a government bailout would 
not be forthcoming.  See, e.g., Jeffrey McCracken & Serena Ng, Bondholders Plan 
CIT Rescue, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009, at A1 (outlining the deal for a $3 billion 
high interest rate emergency loan from bondholders); CIT Debt Restructuring 
OK’d by Board, CBS NEWS, Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/ 
10/02/business/main5357941.shtml (discussing alternative proposals for a debt-
equity swap or prepackaged reorganization in the event of bankruptcy). 
 21. E.g., Editorial, CIT on the Verge, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2009, at A30. 
 22. See VERN MCKINLEY & GARY GEGENHEIMER, CATO INST., POLICY 
ANALYSIS NO. 637, BRIGHT LINES AND BAILOUTS: TO BAIL OR NOT TO BAIL, 
THAT IS THE QUESTION 21–23 (Advance Copy, 2009), available at http:// 
www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-637.pdf (reviewing bank bailouts and public pro-
nouncements).  “The justifications for the series of bailouts during the current 
crisis have been devoid of transparency regarding the precise, institution-specific 
justification for intervention.  There has been no bright-line rule.”  Id. at 21. 
 23. See Thomas F. Cooley & Thomas Philippon, The Bailout, in RESTORING 
FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 323, 323–25 (Viral V. 
Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009) [hereinafter RESTORING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY].  “Our overall assessment is that the U.S. bailout was ill-conceived 
from the start, both technically and strategically.  It gave away taxpayer money, it 
was confused and inefficient, and in some respects it worsened the crisis.”  Id. at 
323. 
 24. See Huberto M. Ennis & H.S. Malek, Bank Risk of Failure and the Too-Big-
to-Fail Policy, ECON. Q. (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Richmond, Va.), 
Spring 2005, at 21, 21–22 (“The too-big-to-fail terminology sometimes can be 
misleading.  While the systemic importance of an organization tends to be closely 
related to its size, this is not always the case.”). 
 25. William Poole, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis from 1998 
to 2008, used this phrase to describe secondary mortgage market giants Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.  William Poole, Op-Ed, Too Big to Fail, or to Survive, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, at WK11. 
 26. See Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 7, at 2–3 (statement of 
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available 
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stration’s plan for regulatory reform27 calls these institutions “Tier 1 
Financial Holding Companies” or “Tier 1 FHCs,” defined as “[a]ny 
financial firm whose combination of size, leverage, and intercon-
nectedness could pose a threat to financial stability if it failed.”28  
Internationally, these institutions have been referred to as “large 
complex financial institutions” or “LCFIs.”29  
  
at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_ 
id=0a0ec016-ad61-4736-b6e3-7eb61fbc0c69.  Chairman Bernanke’s testimony 
about the Bear Stearns bailout gives particular insight into his perspective on 
TBTF, which raises “difficult questions of public policy.”  Id. at 2. 
Normally, the market sorts out which companies survive and which fail, 
and that is as it should be.  However, the issues raised here extended well 
beyond the fate of one company.  Our financial system is extremely com-
plex and interconnected, and Bear Stearns participated extensively in a 
range of critical markets.  The sudden failure of Bear Stearns likely would 
have led to a chaotic unwinding of positions in those markets and could 
have severely shaken confidence.  The company’s failure could also have 
cast doubt on the financial positions of some of Bear Stearns’ thousands 
of counterparties and perhaps of companies with similar businesses.  
Given the exceptional pressures on the global economy and financial sys-
tem, the damage caused by a default by Bear Stearns could have been se-
vere and extremely difficult to contain.  Moreover, the adverse impact of 
a default would not have been confined to the financial system but would 
have been felt broadly in the real economy through its effects on asset 
values and credit availability.  
  To prevent a disorderly failure of Bear Stearns and the unpredictable 
but likely severe consequences for market functioning and the broader 
economy, the Federal Reserve, in close consultation with the Treasury 
Department, agreed to provide funding to Bear Stearns through JPMorgan 
Chase.  Over the following weekend, JPMorgan Chase agreed to purchase 
Bear Stearns and assumed Bear’s financial obligations. 
Id. at 2–3; see also Federal Reserve Board, Minutes of the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System (Mar. 16, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/other/other20080627a2.pdf; Federal Reserve Board, Minutes of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Mar. 14, 2008), http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/other20080627a1.pdf . 
 27. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION (2009), http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_ 
web.pdf. 
 28. Id. at 10. 
 29. See Anthony Saunder et al., Enhanced Regulation of Large, Complex Finan-
cial Institutions, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 23, at 139 (de-
fining LCFIs as “financial intermediaries engaged in some combination of com-
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As early as 2004, in advance of the current crisis, the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Chicago hosted an international conference,30 seeking 
analyses and recommendations for resolving large bank insolvencies, 
premised on the idea that: 
[B]ank failures like illness, death and taxes, are almost a cer-
tainty at some time in our future. . . . Past failures have fre-
quently been resolved only at very high cost to society, but 
they need not be. . . . [T]he cost could be reduced through 
planning ahead in the good times and having a well-
developed, credible, and widely publicized plan ready to put 
into action by policymakers when the need arises.31 
These institutions have also been called “too big to save”32 be-
cause “[t]he costs of a partial or complete bailout are likely to be 
very high.  The costs comprise not only direct costs for the taxpay-
ers, but also the indirect costs of weakened market discipline and 
greater moral hazard.”33 
Identifying specific financial institutions that federal regulators 
currently believe may be too big to fail does not present a mystery.  
From February 25, 2009, through late April 2009, nineteen banks 
were required to participate in the Supervisory Capital Assessment 
Program (SCAP) or “stress testing.”34  On April 24, 2009, the Wall 
Street Journal reported the following list of “banks” undergoing 
  
mercial banking, investment banking, asset management, and insurance, whose 
failure poses a systematic risk or externality to the financial system as a whole”).  
 30. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, International Banking Conference Series, 
http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/events/international_series.cfm (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2010). 
 31. SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: RESOLVING LARGE BANK INSOLVENCIES, at vii 
(Douglas D. Evanoff & George G. Kaufman eds., 2005) [hereinafter SYSTEMIC 
FINANCIAL CRISES]. 
 32. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, “Too Big to Save”—Toward a Functional Approach to 
Resolving Crises in Global Financial Institutions, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES, 
supra note 31, at 193. 
 33. Id. at 196. 
 34. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY 
CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION (2009), http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf [hereinaf-
ter FRB SCAP WHITEPAPER] (providing a whitepaper analysis with a detailed 
description of SCAP). 
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stress testing: J.P. Morgan Chase & Company, Citigroup, Bank of 
America Corporation, Wells Fargo & Company, Goldman Sachs 
Group, Morgan Stanley, MetLife, PNC Financial Services Group, 
US Bancorp, Bank of NY Mellon Corporation, SunTrust Banks Inc., 
State Street Corporation, Capital One Financial Corporation, BB&T 
Corporation, Regions Financial Corporation, American Express 
Company, Fifth Third Bancorp, Keycorp, and GMAC LLC.35   
Entities selected for SCAP included “[a]ll domestic [bank hold-
ing companies] with year‐end 2008 assets exceeding $100 billion.”36  
These entities, all popularly referred to as “banks,” include not only 
commercial banking operations holding bank charters and accepting 
federally insured deposits but also insurance companies, mortgage 
banks, investment banks, and auto financers.  Four federal bank 
regulatory agencies, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, the Federal Reserve Banks, FDIC, and OCC required these 
large financial conglomerates to participate in the SCAP as part of 
the ongoing supervisory process.37  As the Federal Reserve Report 
acknowledges, “These 19 firms collectively hold two‐thirds of the 
assets and more than one‐half of the loans in the U.S. banking sys-
tem, and support a very significant portion of the credit intermedia-
tion done by the banking sector.”38 
Now is the time to address the “too big to fail” financial struc-
tures.  Absent clear direction from Congress that TBTF as a govern-
ment policy must be rejected, the seeds of the next financial crisis 
remain.39  To think that financial behemoths have learned their les-
sons during the current crisis is to believe in fairy tales.40 
  
 35. Posting of WSJ Staff to Real Time Economics, http://blogs.wsj.com/ eco-
nomics/ (Apr. 24, 2009, 14:46 EST). 
 36. FRB SCAP WHITEPAPER, supra note 34, at 1. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  To paraphrase John Donne, no one of these TBTF institutions is an is-
land.  See JOHN DONNE, Meditation XVII, in DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT 
OCCASIONS 107 (Ann Arbor Paperbacks 1959) (1624).  When one of them fails, 
the bell tolls for the U.S. and global economies.  See id. 
 39. See generally Viral V. Acharya & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, The Financial 
Sector Bailout: Sowing the Seeds of the Next Crisis?, in RESTORING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY, supra note 23, at 327 (arguing that the “overly generous” governmen-
tal actions compare unfavorably with U.K. response).  “The [U.S. bailout] 
schemes further shield the unhealthy institutions and their management from mar-
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B.  Recognizing the Cost of TBTF 
In July 2009, Neil Barovsky, Special Inspector General for the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), estimated that $23.7 trillion 
in taxpayer money could be expended, not only through TARP, but 
also through dozens of related programs intended to shore up the 
U.S. financial system and rescue the economy.41  Costly government 
actions over the past two years have focused on preventing large 
bank and nonbank financial institution failures through liquidity in-
fusions, asset purchases, assisted acquisitions, and a host of other 
  
ket discipline, exacerbating moral hazard concerns.  The typically sticky nature of 
regulatory responses during past crises raises the disturbing question: Are these 
efforts merely sowing the seeds of the next crisis?”  Id. at 328. 
 40. See, e.g., Stevenson Jacobs, Risk-Taking Is Back for Banks 1 Year After Cri-
sis, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 14, 2009, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/ 
2009/09/13/financial/f080512D22.DTL. 
  A year after the financial system nearly collapsed, the nation's biggest 
banks are bigger and regaining their appetite for risk. 
  Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and others—which have received 
tens of billions of dollars in federal aid—are once more betting big on 
bonds, commodities and exotic financial products, trading that nearly 
stopped during the financial crisis. 
. . . . 
  Through mergers and the failure of Lehman Brothers, the mammoth 
banks whose near-collapse prompted government rescues have gotten 
even bigger, increasing the risk they pose to the financial system.  And 
they still make bets that, in the aggregate, are worth far more than the 
capital they have on hand to cover against potential losses.   
Id. 
 41. Following the Money: Report of the Special Inspector General for the Trou-
bled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Over-
sight & Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) [hereinafter Following the Money] 
(statement of Neil Barovsky, Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program), available at http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option 
=com_content&task=view&id=2779&Itemid=2; Dawn Kopecki & Catherine 
Dodge, U.S. Rescue May Reach $23.7 Trillion, Barofsky Says, BLOOMBERG.COM, 
July 20, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aY0tX 
8UysIaM (“U.S. taxpayers may be on the hook for as much as $23.7 trillion to 
bolster the economy and bail out financial companies . . . .”). 
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poorly coordinated responses to the “squeaky wheel of the moment,” 
adopted in a largely ad hoc fashion, with little transparency.42   
While it may not be possible to assign a dollar cost attributable 
solely to the TBTF policy, that philosophy has been the central driv-
ing force behind each bailout listed above.43  As such, the present 
and future cost of TBTF is mind-boggling.  No one can argue with 
the assessment that government bailouts have grown to “unprece-
dented scope, scale, and complexity.”44  Recognizing that TBTF is 
only one component of the business practices and government poli-
cies that contributed to and exacerbated the current crisis, scholars 
and commentators45 are focusing analysis on other, more immediate 
triggering factors: Federal Reserve interest rate policy (keeping in-
terest rates low for so long that excess liquidity in our economy con-
tributed to a real estate bubble); unregulated mortgage originators 
and poor loan underwriting standards; industry compensation poli-
  
 42. Oversight Concerns Regarding Treasury Department Conduct of the Trou-
bled Assets Relief Program: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th 
Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Gene L. Dodaro, Acting Comptroller Gen. of the 
U.S.), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09266t.pdf (“Treasury has 
provided more than $155 billion in capital to 87 institutions through [the Capital 
Purchase Program] as of December 5, 2008.  It has also established a Systemically 
Significant Failing Institution (SSFI) program, through which Treasury may invest 
in any financial instrument, including debt, equity, or warrants determined to be a 
troubled asset . . . .”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-
658, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: JUNE 2009 STATUS OF EFFORTS TO 
ADDRESS TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES (2009), http://www.gao. 
gov/new.items/d09658.pdf. 
 43. See supra notes 7–13 and accompanying text. 
 44. Following the Money, supra note 41, at 1 (opening statement of Edolphus 
Towns, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform), available at http:// 
oversight.house.gov/documents/20090721093704.pdf. 
 45. See, e.g., LES LEOPOLD, THE LOOTING OF AMERICA: HOW WALL STREET’S 
GAME OF FANTASY FINANCE DESTROYED OUR JOBS, PENSIONS, AND PROSPERITY 
AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT ch. 6 (2009) (summarizing both “conservative” 
and “liberal” explanations for the causes of the crisis); HAL S. SCOTT, THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009) (examining the causes of the crisis).  Arguing 
that collateral debt obligation (CDO) derivatives and credit default swaps are the 
“weapons of mass destruction” (Warren Buffet’s term) at the heart of a global 
“fantasy-finance casino,” Leopold calls for a fundamental reevaluation of the 
structural causes of both the Great Depression and the current crisis.  LEOPOLD, 
supra, ch. 1. 
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cies that encouraged excessive risk-taking; securitization of loans 
that removed the balance sheet risk of loan default from the origina-
tor; complex unregulated derivative securities; and counter-party 
risk.46  All these factors are verifiable contributors to the crisis; how-
ever, the overarching premise that the government would step in 
once a TBTF institution became in danger of failing created the ul-
timate in moral hazard.47  Large institutions not only had no incen-
tive to avoid risky lending and investment practices, they were posi-
tively incented to pursue such practices because of an implicit gov-
ernment guarantee against failure. 
Putting a dollar figure on the total costs of the recession will be 
possible only in hindsight.  Even with the perspective of time, total 
cost calculations will vary among reasonable economists.  Breaking 
out costs attributable specifically to the TBTF problem is and will be 
even more difficult.  Nevertheless, TBTF is a significant factor in 
costs we can observe and quantify now, including specific govern-
ment cash outlays, damage to the real economy,48 loss of output and 
employment, increase in the national debt and potential for infla-
tion—which could require the Federal Reserve to increase interest 
rates dramatically, potentially precipitating another recession.49   
Former President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis Gary H. Stern, who has written extensively on the issue of 
“Too Big To Fail,” both prior to and in the aftermath of the current 
  
 46. LEOPOLD, supra note 45, at 73. 
 47. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 48. Cf. Paul H. Kupiec & Carlos D. Ramirez, Bank Failures and the Cost of 
Systemic Risk (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2009-06, 2009), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2009/wp2009/CFR_WP_ 
2009_06KupiecRamirez.pdf (investigating “the effect of bank failures on eco-
nomic growth using data from 1900 to 1930, a period that predates active govern-
ment stabilization policies and includes periods of banking system distress that are 
not coincident with recessions”).  This study concludes that bank failures engender 
significant negative externalities that measurably reduce economic growth.  Id. at 
38.  Although government policies implemented after the data period here, such as 
deposit insurance, efficient bank resolution procedures, and prudential bank super-
vision, may mitigate the impact of bank failures on economic growth, these gov-
ernment policies encourage moral hazard, increase bank risk-taking, and distort 
resource allocation.  Id. at 39. 
 49. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND 
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION, at xi (2009).  
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financial crisis,50 concludes that maintaining the status quo with re-
gard to TBTF is unacceptable because of the substantial costs TBTF 
is likely to impose on the U.S. economy.51  In his words, “We cannot 
afford such costs.”52  “Once immediate fires have been doused, poli-
cymakers will have to turn to reining in TBTF because, left un-
checked, the TBTF embers remaining from our emergency response 
will likely contribute to future financial conflagrations.”53 
One of the most disturbing aspects of the current economic dis-
ruption and taxpayer burden attributable to TBTF is that Congress 
has considered this issue before and passed legislation54 specifically 
designed to end this unfair and costly doctrine. 
II. THE FIX THAT DID NOT FIX THE TBTF PROBLEM:  
FDICIA’S RISK-BASED PREMIUMS, LEAST COST TEST,  
AND PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION 
In the wake of the banking and thrift crisis of the 1980s,55 Con-
gress acted to enhance market discipline through the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA).56  Citing the 
  
 50. See generally Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Policy Studies: Too Big To 
Fail, http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/studies/tbtf/tbtf.cfm 
(collected articles from 1988 to present). 
 51. Regulating and Resolving Institutions Considered “Too Big to Fail”: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 6 
(2009) [hereinafter Too Big to Fail Hearing] (statement of Gary H. Stern, Presi-
dent and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis), available at 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news_events/pres/ sterntestimony05-06-09.pdf. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Gary H. Stern, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Too Big to 
Fail: The Way Forward, Address at Winona State University (Nov. 13, 2008), 
available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news_events/pres/stern11-13-08.cfm. 
 54. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act of 1991 (FDICIA), Pub. L. 
No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236; discussion infra Part II. 
 55. See generally United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 845–48 (1996) 
(providing a succinct history of the savings-and-loan industry and its regulation 
through the crisis of the 1980s). 
 56. FDICIA, 105 Stat. 2236.  See also Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, 
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 401(a)(2), 
101(6), 103 Stat. 183 (abolishing the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) 
and creating the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the current federal thrift regu-
 
File: Graham Final.doc Created on:  3/19/10 2:49 PM Last Printed: 3/19/10 2:49 PM 
130 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 8, No. 2  
severity of that crisis, in which 10 percent of the commercial and 
savings bank industry and 25 percent of the thrift industry failed be-
tween 1980 and 1991, commentators have described FDICIA as “the 
most important banking legislation since the Banking (Glass-
Steagall) Act, which was enacted in 1933 at the depth of the previ-
ous most severe banking crisis in U.S. history.”57  Just as in the cur-
rent crisis, the number of failures and, ultimately, the high cost to 
taxpayers as a result of the savings-and-loan crisis were increased by 
flaws in the financial institution regulatory structure that “encour-
aged insured institutions to assume excessive credit and interest rate 
risks and bank regulators to delay imposing corrective sanctions on 
troubled institutions and resolving economically insolvent institu-
tions.”58 
FDICIA’s three most important deposit insurance reforms—(1) 
capital-based prompt corrective action (PCA), (2) risk-based deposit 
  
lator).  Proposals now under consideration would abolish the both the thrift charter 
and the OTS.  E.g., DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A 
NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 
(2009) (presenting the Obama administration’s plan for financial regulatory re-
form), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalRe-
port_web.pdf.  FIRREA also terminated the existence of the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and transferred its responsibilities to the 
FDIC.  FIRREA § 205. 
 57. PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION IN BANKING: 10 YEARS LATER, at ix (George 
G. Kaufman ed., Research in Fin. Servs.: Private & Pub. Policy, Vol. 14, 2002).  
Other commentators have described the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
(GLBA) in similar terms.  E.g., Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act: A New Frontier in Financial Services, 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/banking/gramm/index.html.  Whereas FDICIA 
was intended to impose restrictions on the banking industry and its federal regula-
tors, GLBA was expansive, eliminating the Glass Steagall wall between banking 
and securities powers for banks.  Id.  The impact of those expanded powers and 
the mind-set that commercial banking should no longer be kept separate from 
investment banking contributed to the current crisis just as much as the failure of 
bank regulators to follow the PCA and least cost resolution strictures of FDICIA.  
See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on 
Financial Reform (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-financial-reform. 
 58. PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION, supra note 57, at ix. 
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insurance premiums, and (3) least cost resolution59—represent Con-
gressional response to issues highlighted by the thrift and banking 
crisis of the 1980s. 
First, PCA60 was intended to address regulatory forbearance,61 
graphically illustrated by supervisory delay in closing insolvent 
thrifts.  Delayed closings substantially increased the cost to the in-
surance fund and to taxpayers as these “zombie institutions”62 con-
tinued to operate their way into increasingly negative net worth be-
fore their primary regulator, itself strapped for resources, finally 
formally closed them.63 
  
 59. Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC 
Improvement Act of 1991, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 325 (1993). 
 60. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831o (West 2001 & Supp. 2009).  PCA assigns banks to one 
of five categories, based on leverage ratio and total risk-based capital ratio: well 
capitalized, adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, significantly undercapital-
ized, and critically undercapitalized.  Id.  Once a bank drops below the require-
ments to be “adequately capitalized,” regulators are obligated to follow increas-
ingly stringent enforcement measures as capital declines and, within 90 days after 
an institution becomes “critically undercapitalized” (having a leverage ratio of less 
than 2%), the primary regulator must close the institution or explain to Congress 
the reasons why the institution was not closed.  Id.  
 61. I call this the “Scarlett O’Hara Approach to Problem Solving.”  1. Denial: 
“Fiddle-dee-dee. War, war, war; this war talk’s spoiling all the fun at every party 
this spring.  I get so bored I could scream.  Besides . . . there isn’t going to be any 
war.” and 2. Postponing the inevitable confrontation with a difficult situation: “I’ll 
think of some way . . . .  After all . . . tomorrow is another day.”  GONE WITH THE 
WIND (Selznick International Pictures 1939).  
 62. Economist Edward Kane coined this term during the savings-and-loan crisis 
of the 1980s to describe an economically insolvent bank that does not file formal 
bankruptcy because its regulators and central bank keep it open.  See Bill Berg-
man, How the Federal Reserve Contributes to Crises, MORNINGSTAR ADVISOR, 
June/July 2009, at 40, 41–42.  Kane explains that the term “zombie” emphasizes 
“the dangers of keeping an institution that was deeply insolvent alive, or at least 
walking.  The notion of the zombie is that it would be put in its grave by its credi-
tors if it weren't for the black magic of government credit support guarantees and 
loans.”  Id. at 42. 
 63. See generally EDWARD J. KANE, THE S&L INSURANCE MESS: HOW DID IT 
HAPPEN? (1989); Lawrence H. White, Why is the U.S. Banking Industry in Trou-
ble? Business Cycles, Loan Losses, and Deposits, in THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN 
BANKING (Lawrence H. White ed., 1993). 
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Second, risk-based insurance premiums64 were aimed at a more 
equitable assessment method of funding federal deposit insurance.   
Institutions that posed the greatest risk of loss to the insurance fund 
were to pay the highest premiums.  Risk-based insurance premiums 
(and the other two key FDICIA provisions discussed here) attempted 
to correct perverse incentives.65  One of those perverse incentives, 
classic moral hazard, results when the costs of engaging in risky ac-
tivities can be shifted to others—be it the FDIC, taxpayers, or other 
banks that pay insurance premiums—while the benefits accruing 
from risky activities are retained.66  Higher insurance premiums re-
sult in internalization of the costs of risky activities, at least to some 
degree.67 
Third, the “least cost resolution” test68 was supposed to put an 
end to “too big to fail”; however, it came with a big exception.  In 
the present crisis, the exception for systemic risk has completely dis-
placed the least cost test.  Under the systemic risk exception, the 
FDIC does not have to choose the least costly resolution for a failing 
institution: 
if, upon written recommendation of the [FDIC] Board of Di-
rectors (upon a vote of not less than two-thirds of the mem-
bers of the [FDIC] Board of Directors) and the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (upon a vote of not 
  
 64. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1) (2006). 
 65. See Carnell, supra note 59, at 317–24 (discussing perverse incentives for 
owners and managers of financial institutions and for regulators).  For regulators, 
“[t]he benefits of forbearance (and the costs of stringency) are short-term and eas-
ily identifiable.  The costs of forbearance (and the benefits of stringency) are long-
term and less obvious.”  Id. at 322.  During the crisis of the 1980s, regulators and 
bankers alike succumbed to two perverse incentives which, in my experience as a 
former regulator, can be characterized as “not on my watch” and “betting the 
bank.”  The first is an effort to defer negative consequences—actual cost and repu-
tational damage.  The second occurs when the bank is insolvent or nearly so.  Both 
bank management and regulators, with little left to lose at this point, gamble that 
the institution, through high risk investments or activities, can earn its way back to 
health.  This approach almost always increases the amount of loss.  The correct 
response to both temptations is: when you are in a hole, stop digging. 
 66. Carnell, supra note 59, at 319. 
 67. See generally id. at 358–62 (discussing risk-based premiums). 
 68. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4), amended by Helping Families Save Their Homes 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 204(d), 123 Stat. 1632, 1650–51. 
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less than two-thirds of the members of such Board), the Sec-
retary of the Treasury (in consultation with the President) de-
termines that (I) [compliance with the least cost test] would 
have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or fi-
nancial stability; and (II) any action or assistance under this 
[provision] would avoid or mitigate such adverse effects.69 
More safeguards built into the systemic risk exception to the 
least cost resolution test include requirements: (1) that the Secretary 
of the Treasury document the decision70 and provide written notice 
to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
and the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs 
(now the House Committee on Financial Services);71 (2) that the 
GAO review the decision and prepare a report to Congress;72 and (3) 
that the FDIC recoup any losses to the insurance fund caused by ex-
ercise of the systemic risk exception through a special assessment on 
all insured depository institutions.73  Obviously, Congress intended 
the systemic risk exception to be invoked rarely and only after thor-
ough analysis and coordinated approval at the highest levels of mul-
tiple bank regulatory agencies—with virtually guaranteed second-
guessing by Congress. 
In 1993, shortly after passage of the FDICIA, informed commen-
tators noted that “[p]roperly implemented, the reforms should align 
the incentives of institutions’ owners, managers, and regulators more 
closely with the interests of the deposit insurance funds.  But vigor-
ous, good-faith implementation is crucial.”74  Another observer con-
cluded that “[a]lthough FDICIA does not ban the too-big-to-fail doc-
  
 69. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i). 
 70. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(iii). 
 71. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(v). 
 72. Id. § 1823(c)(G)(4)(iv). 
 73. Id. § 1823(c)(G)(4)(ii), amended by Helping Families Save Their Homes Act 
§ 204(d). 
 74. Carnell, supra note 59, at 317; see also Lissa Lamkin Broome, Redistributing 
Bank Insolvency Risks: Challenges to Limited Liability in the Bank Holding Com-
pany Structure, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 935 (1993) (presenting another study of 
methods to reduce moral hazard and increase market discipline written shortly 
after passage of FIRREA). 
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trine, it has substantially reduced the likelihood of future large bank 
bailouts.”75  These expectations obviously have not been met. 
Given FDICIA’s limitations on “too big to fail,” serious attention 
must now be directed to determining how federal financial regula-
tory agencies could override the least cost test to arrange government 
bailouts for such a large number of financial institutions in 2008–
2009.76  Several factors were likely at work, including: (1) failure to 
recognize systemic risk in the economy in time to prevent problems 
that demanded least-cost-test override;77 (2) failure to address eco-
nomic incentives for financial institution growth and interconnected-
ness, which intensified over the fifteen years between passage of the 
FDICIA and the current crisis;78 (3) counter-cyclical regulation is-
sues making it more difficult for regulators to put the brakes on risky 
activities in a time of general economic prosperity;79 (4) failure to 
  
 75. Larry D. Wall, Too-Big-To-Fail After FDICIA, ECON. REV. (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, Ga.), Jan./Feb. 1993, at 1, 1. 
 76. See supra notes 7–13 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Stern, supra note 53 (quoting GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO 
BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS 112, 114 (2004)).   
Policymakers could reduce the uncertainty that they face when a large 
bank fails by knowing the potential exposures other banks have to the 
failing institution in advance and practicing their response to such fail-
ures. . . . [Supervisors should examine] how the failure of one institution 
would affect the solvency of [other large banks]. . . . [T]he government 
would focus on spillovers and cross-institution exposure. . . . Supervisors 
should develop detailed plans for addressing the failure of a large bank, 
test those procedures in simulations, and revise the procedures to account 
for test results.  Supervisors should repeat the cycle regularly, given the 
rapidly changing operations of the largest banks. 
Id. (alterations in original); see also Viral V. Acharya et al., Regulating Systemic 
Risk, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 23, at 283, 283–303. 
 78. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Fi-
nancial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased 
Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215. 
 79. See 1 DIV. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 246 (“To impose 
prudential restraints is meddlesome and it restricts profits.  If the banking system 
is expanding rapidly, if they can show they’re making good money by the new 
business, for us to try to be too tough with them, to hold them back, is just not 
going to be acceptable.” (quoting Fed. Reserve Governor Charles Partee)). 
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develop a “financial disaster recovery plan” in advance;80 and (5) 
political pressure and effective lobbying on behalf of large financial 
institutions.81   
In 2002, the Western Economic Association convened a confer-
ence on “Prompt Corrective Action In Banking: 10 Years Later”82 to 
examine issues of market discipline under the PCA regime.  Now, as 
then, the threshold question is to determine the primary goal of fi-
nancial institution supervision.  From the establishment of federal 
deposit insurance in 1933 until the banking crisis of the 1980s, regu-
lators understood that the principal objective of banking supervision 
was to prevent bank failures.83  This was a reasonable Congressional 
mandate following the devastating impact of bank failures during the 
early years of the Great Depression.  During the banking and saving-
and-loan crisis of the 1980s, it became apparent that too much focus 
on the goal of avoiding bank failures resulted in regulatory forbear-
ance,84 or delay in closing insolvent financial institutions, which 
substantially increased losses to the deposit insurance fund and to 
taxpayers.  A goal of preventing bank failures is likely to conflict 
with a goal of minimizing cost to the insurance fund.85 
With passage of the FDICIA in 1991, Congress gave bank regu-
lators the unambiguous goal “to resolve the problems of insured de-
  
 80. The need for a specialized means of resolving large financial institutions was 
apparent in the 1984 bailout of Continental Illinois.  See id. at 249 (“In addition to 
systemic risk, the logistical difficulties and potential expense of liquidating a large 
bank also contributed to regulatory reluctance to close such a bank . . . .”). 
 81. See generally Anne Flaherty & Jim Kuhnhenn, House Panel to Begin Push 
on Financial Overhaul, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 14, 2009, 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2010058761_apusfinancialoverhaul
.html (noting that the broad sector of banks, insurance companies, and real estate 
entities spent close to $223 million on lobbying in 2009). 
 82. PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION, supra note 57, at x. 
 83. Robert A. Eisenbeis & Larry D. Wall, The Major Supervisory Initiatives 
Post-FDICIA: Are They Based on the Goals of PCA? Should They Be?, in PROMPT 
CORRECTIVE ACTION, supra note 57, at 110. 
 84. 1 DIV. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 46–51 (discussing the 
use of forbearance). 
 85. See Eisenbeis & Wall, supra note 83, at 109, 111 (“The goals of preventing 
failure and minimizing deposit insurance losses make fundamentally different 
demands on bank supervisors and have different implications for loss sharing and 
incentives to management.”) 
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pository institutions at the least possible long-term cost to the De-
posit Insurance Fund”86—the least cost test discussed above.   
PCA, another key component of FDICIA, limits regulator discre-
tion by listing specific enforcement measures to be imposed as a fi-
nancial institution’s capital drops from “adequately capitalized”87 to 
“undercapitalized”88 to “significantly undercapitalized”89 to “criti-
cally undercapitalized.”90  Within ninety days after a bank’s capital 
level drops to 2 percent of its total assets (critically undercapital-
ized),91 regulators are required to appoint a conservator or receiver 
or to explain the reason for deferring the closing for no more than an 
additional ninety days.92   
Despite these black-and-white statutory standards for taking en-
forcement actions and for closing troubled financial institutions, we 
see in the current crisis regulatory failure to recognize problems at 
the early stages when corrective enforcement measures contemplated 
by FDICIA might save an institution.93  Both financial institutions 
and regulators succumbed to a “bubble mentality” in acting as 
though interest rates would always remain low and residential home 
prices would always increase.94  Then, when the residential real es-
tate bubble burst, bank regulators could not, or would not, follow 
FDICIA’s clear directives to close near-insolvent institutions before 
they could become a severe drain on the Treasury and on the federal 
deposit insurance fund.95 
  
 86. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(a)(1) (2006). 
 87. See 12 C.F.R. § 325.103 (2009) (defining capital categories of adequately 
capitalized, undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized, and critically under-
capitalized as measured by total risk-based capital ratio, Tier 1 risk-based capital 
ratio, and leverage ratio). 
 88. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e) (specifying required regulatory actions). 
 89. See id. § 1831o(f) (specifying required regulatory actions). 
 90. See id. § 1831o(h) (specifying required regulatory actions). 
 91. 12 C.F.R. § 325.103(b)(5). 
 92. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(h)(3). 
 93. See, e.g., supra notes 7–13 and accompanying text. 
 94. See J. Bradford DeLong, Houses in the Air, (Aug. 24, 2005), 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/delong39/English. 
 95. See supra note 7–13 and accompanying text (listing assisted transactions); 
Gary H. Stern, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Better Late Than 
Never: Addressing Too-Big-To-Fail, Address at Brookings Institution (Mar. 31, 
2009), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news_events/pres/Stern03-31-
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III. RECOGNIZING BUBBLES 
If we learn anything from the current crisis, it should be recogni-
tion of a phenomenon that has, in a dependably recurrent pattern, 
seduced and deluded both the wise and the foolish: bubbles hap-
pen.96    
The following five stages97 accurately describe the real estate 
bubble which, in part, triggered the financial melt-down: 
1.  Displacement refers to a change in economic circum-
stances which creates new, profitable opportunities, such as 
the very low interest rates and rising home prices.  
2.  Euphoria or overtrading occurs when news about profits 
from rising home prices, especially when purchased with 
high leverage, draws more buyers to the market and creates a 
feedback loop driving prices up even more. 
3.  Mania or bubble is the high point when the prospect of 
easy gains—in this case through low-doc, no-doc, “liar 
loans” funding the purchase of a home whose value “will 
only go up”—attracts first-time investors and “swindlers ea-
ger to mulct them of their money.”98   
4.  Distress is the beginning of the end, as knowledgeable in-
vestors perceive that “expected profits cannot possibly justify 
  
09.pdf (outlining ways to correct these regulatory failures to use PCA before it is 
too late).  The Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank proposes to address this prob-
lem in three ways:  early identification, enhanced PCA, and communication of a 
bank’s deteriorating capital to creditors.  Id. 
 96. See EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF 
FINANCIAL SPECULATION 21 (1999) (explaining that the bubble metaphor was first 
applied to speculative excesses at the time of the South Sea Bubble in 1720).  Be-
fore the South Sea Bubble, there was the Tulip Bubble.  Id.  Like the tulip, a bub-
ble’s “ephemeral beauty [can be] seen as a seductive illusion to the unwary. . . . A 
bubble grew rapidly, delighting beholders with its reflective brilliance, but disap-
peared instantaneously.  It was sustained only by air or wind . . . .”  Id. 
 97. NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
WORLD 121–22 (2008) (listing the five stages of an asset bubble—ties to the real 
estate bubble are the author’s addition). 
 98. Id. at 122. 
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the now-exorbitant price,”99 especially when there are shocks 
such as higher interest rates, re-pricing of adjustable rate 
loans, higher loan defaults, and the first failures of subprime 
lenders.  More sophisticated investors begin to take profits by 
selling.  Others continue to succumb to the “greater fool the-
ory.”100 
5.  Revulsion or discredit is the bursting of the bubble.  As 
prices fall, everyone “stampedes for the exits.”101   
In addition to these five stages of a bubble, there are three other 
common features: asymmetric information, cross-border capital 
flows, and easy credit102—all present in the real estate bubble. 
“Irrational exuberance”103 describes the psychological basis of a 
speculative bubble, defined as:  
[A] situation in which news of price increases spurs investor 
enthusiasm, which spreads by psychological contagion from 
person to person, in the process amplifying stories that might 
justify the price increases and bringing in a larger and larger 
class of investors, who, despite doubts about the real value of 
an investment, are drawn to it partly through envy of others’ 
successes and partly through a gambler’s excitement.104 
  
 99. Id. 
100. The “greater fool theory” describes investment actions apparently predicated 
on the idea that however overpriced an asset may be, the purchaser can turn a 
quick profit by selling it to an even greater fool.  See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER 
ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND 
SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 74 (2003). 
101. FERGUSON, supra note 97, at 122. 
102. Id. 
103. A popular phrase first used by then Chairman of the Fed. Reserve Alan 
Greenspan in discussing the 1980s Japanese bubble economy and subsequent col-
lapse.  Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The 
Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society, Remarks at the Annual 
Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of the American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research (Dec. 5, 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm. 
104. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 2 (2d ed. 2005). 
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George Soros has graphed the “boom-bust” model105 through 
eight stages essentially tracking the five stages above.  His graph 
illustrates a trend that starts slowly, accelerates gradually, and falls 
sharply.106  He also emphasizes the feedback loop in which market 
participants begin to believe the hype, accelerating the rise in 
prices.107  This feedback loop is not new, even in the real estate 
arena.  In the 1980s, real estate moguls “flipped” properties, quickly 
inflating the apparent value of properties with several sales during 
the course of a day, each with a higher sales price backed by a new 
higher appraisal—until the savings and loans associations that 
funded loans collateralized by falsely-valued real estate crashed in 
failure.108 
The recorded history of economic bubbles109 extends from Tulip 
Mania in the 1630s, to the South Sea Bubble in 1720, the Mississippi 
Bubble, the Railway Mania of 1845, the Stock Market Crash of 
1929, the Bank and S&L Crisis in the 1980s, the Japanese Bubble of 
the 1980s, the Dot-com Bubble in the late 1990s, and now, to the 
present fallout of a residential real estate bubble.110  Economists un-
derstand bubbles quite thoroughly.111  Given human greed we can, 
  
105. GEORGE SOROS, THE CRASH OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS: THE NEW 
PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS 66–70 (2009). 
106. Id. at 67. 
107. See id. at 67–73 (calling this phenomenon “reflexive, circular relationships”). 
108. See David B. Newdorf, Inside Fraud, Outside Negligence and the Savings 
and Loan Crisis: When Does Management Wrongdoing Excuse Professional Mal-
practice?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1182–83 (1993); Michelle D. Monse, Ethi-
cal Issues in Representing Thrifts, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 12 n.40 (1992). 
109. See generally CHANCELLOR, supra note 96 (providing a history of bubbles). 
110. Id.; see Yuliya Demyanyk, Ten Myths About Subprime Mortgages, FED. RES. 
BANK CLEVELAND ECON. COMMENT., July 23, 2009, http://www.clevelandfed.org/ 
research/commentary/2009/0509.cfm.  “[N]either the origin of this crisis or the 
way it has played out was unique at all. . . . Argentina in 1980, Chile in 1982, 
Sweden, Norway, and Finland in 1992, Mexico in 1994, and Thailand, Indonesia, 
and Korea in 1997 all experienced a pattern similar to the U.S. subprime boom-
and-bust cycle.”  Id. 
111. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from 
the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373 (2008), reprinted in 
NANCY B. RAPOPORT ET AL., ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE 
CORPORATE SCANDAL READER 1129, 1136–37 (2d ed. 2009) (providing hypothe-
ses for the residential real estate bubble, while noting that “[o]ccasional bubbles 
may well be an inevitable side effect of a market economy”). 
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with certainty, anticipate future bubbles.  The real challenge is to 
establish in advance some regulatory mechanism to recognize future 
bubbles as they develop and to minimize the widespread economic 
pain when they ultimately crash.  This responsibility fits with duties 
of a systemic risk regulator.  
The Federal Reserve has been proposed as the new systemic risk 
regulator.112  Bubbles do contribute to inflation and influence mone-
tary policy, which suggests that the Federal Reserve has the exper-
tise to identify an emerging asset bubble.  Unfortunately, recent his-
tory shows that former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan 
presided over the low interest rates, easy credit, and failure to restrict 
predatory lending that were substantial contributing factors in the 
creation of the real estate bubble.113  To counter the groupthink, 
euphoria, and mania which can infect regulators and market partici-
pants alike, it would be wise to separate the responsibility for setting 
monetary policy from the responsibility for monitoring the results, 
past and probable.114  The basic rules of auditing require both separa-
tion of duties and independent review. 
The current financial crisis highlights a critical short-coming to 
be addressed if we are to avoid future financial crises: under-
  
112. Martin N. Bailey et al., A Systemic Regulator for Financial Markets 5 
(Council on Foreign Relations, Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regula-
tion, 2009), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/19256/ (arguing that cen-
tral banks are best positioned to be systemic regulators); U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, supra note 27, 51–54 (the Obama administration’s plan for financial 
reform). 
113. See Symposium, Did the Fed Cause the Housing Bubble?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
27, 2009, at A13 (presenting a series of articles from differing viewpoints, includ-
ing: David Henderson, Don’t Blame Greenspan; Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., What 
Savings Glut?; Todd J. Zwyicki, Low Rates Led to ARMs; David Malpass, The 
Fed Provided the Fuel; Judy Shelton, Loose Money and the Derivative Bubble; 
and Vincent Reinhart, To Change Policy, Change the Law). 
114. Cf. Paul A. Volker in Converstion with Gary H. Stern, REGION (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minn.), Sept. 2009, at 19, 20, available at 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/09-09/ conversation.pdf (“[Y]es, you 
need an overall systemic overseer—not with the regulatory or supervisory author-
ity over particular institutions, rather somebody looking over things, beyond indi-
vidual institutions, for the weaknesses in the system, looking at things that are 
developing that are problematical, various tendencies, some other toxic assets 
perhaps in some other form.”). 
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appreciation of systemic risk.  Bubbles are only one manifestation of 
systemic risk.  Until now, our financial regulatory structure has fo-
cused on the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions 
and markets.  We must restructure our regulatory framework to add 
an independent entity charged with macro-prudential oversight, 
which means keeping an eye on the big picture and having the tools 
to identify and contain systemic risk before an uncontrollable eco-
nomic result swamps global financial systems again.   
As the European Union has already recognized, macro-financial 
factors, the inter-connectedness of markets and institutions, and fi-
nancial globalization play important roles in determining the size, 
nature, and contagious spread of systemic risk.115  New risks will 
emerge; the key to dealing with them in the future is how well we 
plan for them now.  The European Central Bank is specifically 
studying how changes in interest rate policymaking, including im-
proved credit and money supply data, may facilitate earlier action to 
identify financial market distortions and lessen the impact of future 
bubbles.116  With establishment of a new European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) responsible for macro-prudential oversight, the EU 
will empower an independent multi-member board to focus specifi-
cally on identifying risk to the stability of the EU financial system as 
a whole.117  The U.S. should consider this model and tailor it to our 
own regulatory structure. 
  
115. Lucas Papademos, Vice President, European Cent. Bank, Financial Stability 
and Macro-Prudential Supervision: Objectives, Instruments and the Role of the 
ECB, Address at the Center for Financial Studies Conference: The ECB and Its 
Watchers XI (Sept. 4, 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r090908c.pdf. 
116. Ralph Atkins, ECB Plans Revamp on Interest Rates to Tackle Bubbles, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Sept. 8, 2009, at 6, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 
dde525aa-9bc3-11de-b214-00144feabdc0.html.  
117. See Papademos, supra note 115. 
  Following the publication of the Report of the de Larosière Group in 
February 2009 and the Commission Communication in May, the Ecofin 
Council agreed in June 2009 that a new independent body responsible for 
the conduct of macro-prudential oversight in the EU should be estab-
lished, namely the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).  The creation 
of the ESRB was supported by the European Council on 18 and 19 June 
2009.  In the wake of these decisions, the Commission is preparing legal 
texts with concrete provisions concerning the establishment and function-
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IV. RECONSIDERING CONSOLIDATION 
Having identified TBTF as a policy Congress should reconsider, 
we must ask a critical question.  How did the U.S. financial services 
industry come to be dominated by such a small number of large, in-
terconnected entities?118  Retracing the origins of consolidation can 
highlight economic incentives, legislative constructs, and regulatory 
policies that contributed to the present state of the financial services 
industry and to the current state of the national and global economy 
in crisis.  Knowing how and why aggressive consolidation occurred 
may indicate what economic incentives to alter, what regulatory 
policies to revise, what false claims to repudiate, and, finally, what 
legislation to propose in order to avoid a similar financial collapse in 
the future. 
A Federal Reserve Board Staff Study examining “Bank Mergers 
and Banking Structure in the United States, 1980-1998,”119 prepared 
in August 2000, finds: 
Since 1980, the U.S. banking industry has experienced a sus-
tained and unprecedented level of merger activity that has 
substantially affected banking structure.  From 1980 through 
1998, there were approximately 8,000 mergers, involving 
about $2.4 trillion in acquired assets.  Not only has the num-
ber of mergers been large, but from 1990 to 1999 several 
  
ing of the ESRB, which will be transmitted to the European Parliament 
and the Council in late September. 
Id. 
118. See Timothy F. Geithner, Changes in the Structure of the U.S. Financial 
System and Implications for Systemic Risk, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES, supra 
note 31, at 29, for early recognition that consolidation or “[t]he greater systemic 
importance of a smaller number of large bank-centered financial institutions” is 
one of key components of changing market structure that contributes to increased 
systemic risk.  Id. at 30–31.  In 2005, Timothy Geithner was President and CEO of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; he subsequently became Secretary of the 
Treasury in January 2009. 
119. STEPHEN A. RHOADES, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
STAFF STUDY 174, BANK MERGERS AND BANKING STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1980–98 (2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ 
staffstudies/2000-present/ss174.pdf. 
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mergers occurred that, at the time of occurrence, were the 
largest bank mergers in U.S. history.120 
A later Federal Reserve Board Staff Study examining “Bank 
Merger Activity in the United States, 1994–2003,”121 quantifies the 
impact of industry consolidation: 
[D]uring the 1980–2003 period the number of banking orga-
nizations decreased from about 16,000 to about 8,000, and 
mergers of healthy institutions were by far the most impor-
tant cause of that consolidation.  During that period, the share 
of industry assets held by the ten largest commercial banking 
organizations (ranked by assets) rose from 22 percent to 46 
percent, and the share of industry deposits held by the ten 
largest (ranked by deposits) rose from 19 percent to 41 per-
cent.122
 
As the 2000 merger study recognized, consolidation could fun-
damentally restructure an industry, affecting economic performance 
in the areas of price, product and service quality, and production ef-
ficiency.123  Today, that prediction has become reality.  The U.S. 
financial services industry has become sharply divided into global 
mega-banks and smaller community banks.124  Once an industry has 
been restructured, the new structure will persist because of “first-
mover advantages, information asymmetries, switching costs, and 
other market imperfections”125—unless crisis-response legislation 
changes the legal landscape, as demonstrated by the banking reform 
legislation of the 1930s. 
  
120. Id. at 1. 
121. STEVEN J. PILLOFF, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STAFF 
STUDY 176, BANK MERGER ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1994–2003, at 1 
(2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/2000-present/ 
ss176.pdf. 
122. Id. at 1 (analysis based on Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council (FFIEC) 
Consolidated Reports of Income and Condition data). 
123. RHOADES, supra note 119, at 1.  
124. See, e.g., Robert DeYoung & William C. Hunter, Deregulation, the Internet, 
and the Competitive Viability of Large Banks and Community Banks (FRB Chi-
cago Working Paper No. 2001-11, 2001), available at 
http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=290284. 
125. RHOADES, supra note 119, at 1. 
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Factors that have encouraged rapid consolidation126 include: (1) 
legislative changes during the 1980s that deregulated deposit restric-
tions;127 (2) legislation during the 1990s that encouraged geographic 
expansion by easing branching limitations;128 (3) regulator-
facilitated acquisitions of troubled financial institutions as a result of 
the banking and S&L crisis;129 (4) legislation breaking down the 
1930s-era wall between banking, securities, and insurance;130 and (5) 
international and domestic regulatory regimes for financial institu-
tion capital requirements that relied on institution-generated risk 
models, resulting in lower capital requirements for large institu-
tions.131   
In addition to a legal framework that favored consolidation, eco-
nomic incentives added impetus to the trend.  While experts differ 
about whether the largest financial conglomerates actually reap 
  
126. For a comprehensive analysis of bank consolidation from 1979 to 1994, see 
Allen N. Berger et al., The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a 
Long, Strange Trip It’s Been, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, No. 2 
1995, at 55, available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/anil.kashyap/research/ 
transformation.pdf (attributing aggressive consolidation to: (1) regulatory changes, 
including deposit deregulation and geographic expansion through relaxation of 
branching restrictions; and (2) technology and innovation, including information 
processing and loan securitization).  As part of an FDIC study, The Future of 
Banking in America, FDIC economists updated industry consolidation analysis to 
cover the period 1984 to 2003.  George Hanc, Summary and Conclusions, FDIC 
BANKING REV., Nov. 2004, at 1, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/ 
banking/2004nov/article1/br16n1art1.pdf; see also Kenneth D. Jones & Tim 
Critchfield, Consolidation in the U.S. Banking Industry: Is the “Long, Strange 
Trip” About to End?, FDIC BANKING REV, Jan. 2006, at 31, 31–32, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2006jan/article2/article2.pdf (identi-
fying continued consolidation with some indication of stabilization, a conclusion 
that predated the current financial crisis). 
127. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132. 
128. See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338. 
129. See generally 1 DIV. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, supra note 3 (discussing 
the banking crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s). 
130. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 
113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
131. See generally Fed. Reserve Bd., Basel II Capital Accord, Basel I Initiatives, 
and Other Basel-Related Matters, http://www.federalreserve.gov/GeneralInfo/ 
basel2/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2010). 
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economies of scale, enhance diversification, and provide lower cost 
services to consumers or whether they increase systemic risk,132 it is 
inarguable that becoming one of the protected TBTF entities results 
in substantially lower cost of funds.133  Smaller banks are charged a 
higher interest rate when they borrow funds because they lack the 
TBTF implicit federal government guarantee and are therefore 
deemed to be riskier for lenders.134  Current research indicates that 
the cost-of-funds differential between smaller banks and those with 
over $100 billion in assets increased from 0.29 to 0.78 percentage 
points from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the end of the second quar-
ter of 2009, after it had become apparent that federal banking regula-
tors were committed to TBTF as a standard under which institutions 
could expect to be bailed out.135  When controlled for economic un-
certainty, this represents an annual subsidy to the TBTF banks of 
$6.3 billion.136  Based on FDIC data, one can conclude that this sub-
sidy is a major reason for the increased profitability of these TBTF 
banks, effectively representing a redistribution from taxpayers to 
TBTF banks.137  By its nature, TBTF is unfair to small banks and to 
well-managed banks which pay the insurance premiums that fund 
bailouts.138 
  
132. Compare Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An 
Economic Analysis, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1083 (1992) (arguing that consolidation 
would benefit consumers and reduce risk), with Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big 
to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. 
REV. 957 (1992) (arguing that consolidation could have adverse effects on con-
sumers and the safety of the banking industry). 
133. DEAN BAKER & TRAVIS MCARTHUR, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, 
THE VALUE OF THE “TOO BIG TO FAIL” BIG BANK SUBSIDY 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/too-big-to-fail-2009-09.pdf; see also 
Gretchen Morgenson, Fair Game: The Cost of Saving Those Whales, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 3, 2009, at BU1.  
134. BAKER & MCARTHUR, supra note 133, at 2.  
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 4. 
138. See Stephen Labaton, Banks to Rescue Depleted F.D.I.C., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
30, 2009, at A1 (reporting that the deposit insurance fund would be “in the red” by 
the end of the week and discussing the FDIC’s requirement that banks prepay $45 
billion in insurance premiums to replenish the fund). 
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Economists understand that the very existence of federal deposit 
insurance undermines market discipline139 and distorts the financial 
services market.140  Although the appropriate dollar amount of de-
posit insurance coverage (temporarily increased from $100,000 to 
$250,000 per deposit account to preserve depositor and general mar-
ket confidence in the banking system during the current crisis)141 and 
the undesirable consequences of having any level of federal deposit 
insurance can be debated,142 it seems clear on balance that the U.S. 
deposit insurance system was a key factor in restoring confidence 
and stability in our banking system after the wave of banking fail-
ures in the 1930s.143  Deposit insurance played an important role in 
maintaining a long period of few bank failures from the 1930s to the 
1980s.144  The significance of this discussion regarding deposit in-
  
139. But see Jean Pierre Sabourin, The Deposit Insurer’s Role in Maintaining 
Financial Stability, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES, supra note 31, at 59, 61–62 
(noting that a deposit insurer can play an important role in mitigating systemic risk 
by taking action ex ante to assure that large banks are “too-good-to-fail”).  
Sabourin writes from the perspective of President and CEO of the Canada Deposit 
Insurance Corporation.  Because the global aspects of the financial crisis and sub-
sequent corrective measures must be taken into account in proposing effective 
solutions, his breakdown of deposit insurers around the world into three distinct 
categories—“payboxes,” “least cost systems,” and “risk-minimizers”—is an in-
triguing approach.  Id. at 60. 
140. See VASSO P. IOANNIDOU & JAN DE DREU, THE IMPACT OF EXPLICIT DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE ON MARKET DISCIPLINE (Tilburg Univ., No. 2006-5, 2006), available 
at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=53872; Vasso P. Ioannidou & María Fabiana 
Penas, Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from Internal Loan 
Ratings, (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2008-07, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2008/wp2008/ 
CFR_WP_2008_07_vasso.pdf. 
141. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Financial Institution Letter 22-2009, Extension of 
Temporary Increase in Standard Maximum Deposit Insurance Amount (May 22, 
2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2009/fil09022.pdf. 
142. See IOANNIDOU & DE DREU, supra note 140. 
143. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A 
MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1960, at 434–42 (1963). 
144. See generally FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS: A HISTORY 
OF THE FDIC 1933–1983 (1984), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/ 
firstfifty/. 
File: Graham Final.doc Created on: 3/19/10 2:49 PM Last Printed: 3/19/10 2:49 PM 
2010 THE CASE FOR ENDING “TOO BIG TO FAIL” 147 
surance is the possibility that increased concentration of deposits in 
the hands of a few megabanks has created an “uninsurable risk.”145  
The U.S. deposit insurance system was not designed for the 
highly concentrated banking industry we have today.146  One of the 
basic principles of insurance requires that “individual loss exposures 
be independent and spread over a large number of homogeneous 
units so that no single loss is catastrophic to the insurer.”147  Thus, 
the current insolvency of the federal deposit insurance fund, with 
high assessments draining the profits of well-managed, solvent insti-
tutions,148 was entirely foreseeable. Furthermore, unless Congress 
addresses TBTF, this “uninsurable risk” problem will continue to 
threaten the federal deposit insurance system in the future, even after 
the bailouts in progress have been paid for out of public coffers.   
TBTF bailouts not only protect the “wrong” economic actors, 
they also create moral hazard incentives to engage in risky behavior 
based on the expectation of future TBTF bailouts.149  Banks may 
actively pursue internal growth and mergers because they are moti-
vated to become too big to fail.150  In fact, the biggest banks, which 
have been the biggest beneficiaries of TBTF to date, fully expect to 
be selected for more government-assisted mergers, resulting in still 
greater industry consolidation.151 
  
145. Kenneth D. Jones & Chau Nguyen, Increased Concentration in Banking: 
Megabanks and Their Implications for Deposit Insurance, 14 FIN. MARKETS, 
INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 1, 2 (2005). 
146. Id.  
147. Id. 
148. See Labaton, supra note 138 (noting that the special assessments to replenish 
the deposit insurance fund will eliminate the industry’s earnings for 2009). 
149. Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout 
Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951, 957–58 (1992). 
150. Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United 
States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 44 
(2005); see also Viral V. Acharya et al., A Bird’s Eye View—The Financial Crisis 
of 2007–2009: Causes and Remedies, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra 
note 23, at 1, 7 (noting that the TBTF designation is “incredibly costly because it 
induces, somewhat paradoxically, a moral hazard in the form of a race to become 
systemic”). 
151. Jamie Dimon: More Bank Consolidation, CNN MONEY, May 4, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/04/news/companies/Jamie_Dimon.reut/index.htm 
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Reasons for focused congressional attention to the problem 
posed by megabanks that have swelled through consolidation in-
clude: (1) a disproportionate amount of losses accruing as a result of 
the global economic crisis occurred on the balance sheets of a rela-
tive handful of large banking conglomerates;152 (2) TBTF institu-
tions have received the lion’s share of federal government bailout 
assistance;153 (3) large financial institutions can be viewed as “the 
primary private-sector catalysts for the destructive credit boom that 
led to the subprime financial crisis”;154 and (4) far from being pun-
ished for their role in the crisis, the largest banks have become larger 
still through government bailout money and government-facilitated 
acquisitions.155  President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
Richard Fisher put it this way: “In using acquisitions to resolve the 
crisis, we may have unwittingly perpetuated one of its root causes—
the too-big-to-fail doctrine.”156 
  
(quoting Dimon, JP Morgan Chase CEO, “[t]here are still too many banks in the 
United States”). 
152. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. 
REV. 963, 968, 1044–1045 (2009) (“Seventeen large universal banks accounted for 
more than half of the $1.1 trillion of losses reported by the world’s banks and in-
surance companies.”).   
153. See David Cho, Banks “Too Big to Fail” Have Grown Even Bigger, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 28, 2009, at A01. 
154. Wilmarth, supra note 152, at 1046.   
155. See Cho, supra note 153. 
156. Richard W. Fisher, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Dallas, Two Areas of 
Present Concern: The Economic Outlook and the Pathology of Too-Big-to-Fail 
(with Reference to Errol Flynn, Johnny Mercer, Gary Stern and Voltaire), Re-
marks before the Senior Delegates’ Roundtable of the Fixed Income Forum (July 
23, 2009), available at http://dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2009/ 
fs090723.cfm.  The four largest commercial banking organizations—Bank of 
America, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and Citigroup—received substantial 
government assistance during the crisis—“all, at least implicitly, in the name of 
the too-big-to-fail doctrine”—and “[a]s a group, the total asset base of the four has 
grown 30 percent since June 2007.”  Id.  A significant part of that growth results 
from acquisitions.  Id. 
Bank of America’s assets grew 51 percent from June 2007 to March 
2009, assisted in no small part by its acquisitions of Countrywide Finan-
cial and Merrill.  Wells Fargo’s asset base grew 138 percent, thanks 
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After admitting that the financial markets and the national econ-
omy have been ill-served by the size and interrelatedness of financial 
institutions, bank regulators and politicians will face difficult strat-
egy questions.  More research is needed to design feasible means of 
curbing the size and connectedness of financial institutions.  To be 
effective, the management of size and systemic impact will require 
committed attention and real corrective measures.  Superficial ac-
knowledgment that TBTF is a problem will prove as insufficient as 
the belated acknowledgement that predatory lending was a problem.   
Federal Reserve statements now recognize the need for more ef-
fective regulation of large institutions.157  While higher capital, im-
proved risk-management practices, more robust liquidity manage-
ment, better compensation structures, and fair dealings with consum-
ers158 are laudable, these improvements do nothing to address TBTF.  
Strengthened examination and enforcement, even at the system-wide 
level, and “macroprudential” oversight,159 again do nothing to fix 
TBTF.  Cutting back the size and interrelatedness of existing con-
  
mainly to its acquisition of Wachovia.  J.P. Morgan Chase acquired both 
Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual and grew 43 percent. 
Id. 
157. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Financial Regulation and Supervision After the Crisis: The Role of the Federal 
Reserve, Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 54th Economic Confer-
ence (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsev-
ents/speech/bernanke20091023a.htm. 
[T]he Federal Reserve is participating in a range of joint efforts to ensure 
that large, systemically critical financial institutions hold more and 
higher-quality capital, improve their risk-management practices, have 
more robust liquidity management, employ compensation structures that 
provide appropriate performance and risk-taking incentives, and deal 
fairly with consumers.  On the supervisory front, we are taking steps to 
strengthen oversight and enforcement, particularly at the firmwide level, 
and we are augmenting our traditional microprudential, or firm-specific, 
methods of oversight with a more macroprudential, or systemwide, ap-
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glomerates will not be easy160—practically or politically—although 
it has been done, and done in response to financial crises.  Breaking 
up financial oligopolies cannot have been an easy task for Theodore 
Roosevelt at the turn of the twentieth century,161 or for Franklin De-
lano Roosevelt in the 1930s.162  “Almost all significant laws and 
regulations are done in this country in times of crisis.”163 
  
160. See, e.g., Gary H. Stern & Ron Feldman, Addressing TBTF by Shrinking 
Financial Institutions: An Initial Assessment, REGION (Fed. Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis, Minneapolis, Minn.), June 2009, at 8, 10–11, available at http:// 
www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/studies/tbtf/addressing_tbtf_by_shri
nking_revised05-20-09.pdf. 
161. See generally LEWIS L. GOULD, THE PRESIDENCY OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, 
24, 27–32, 49–53, 64, 142–143, 212–218, 223, 279–281 (1991); EDMUND 
MORRIS, THEODORE REX 88–94, 194–196, 206–209, 426–448 (2001). 
162. See generally Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933); L. Randall 
Wray, Lessons from the Subprime Meltdown, CHALLENGE, Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 40, 
reprinted in RAPOPORT ET AL., supra note 111, at 1157, 1193 (adopting the argu-
ment proposed by Robert Shiller that “the housing downturn of 1925–33, during 
which housing prices fell by 30%, provided an opportunity for a revolutionary 
policy response that restructured the housing sector in a manner that made it robust 
for two generations”); Editorial, Keep Consumers Safe by Bringing Back Glass-
Steagall Act, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 2, 2009, at A11, available at 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorials/2010171846_edit02wamu3.html. 
  Nearly a century ago, the government broke up Standard Oil into the 
companies that became Exxon, Mobil, Sohio and Chevron.  It worked 
fine.  It didn't retard the American economy at all.  Former Fed Chairman 
Paul Volcker has proposed doing the same to J.P. Morgan Chase and 
Bank of America.  It should be done. 
  There is an obvious way to begin.  Bring back the Glass-Steagall Act.  
That was the original law passed in the Roosevelt administration that cre-
ated deposit insurance.  To limit the risk to the Treasury, it forbade a bank 
holding company from owning other financial companies.  [The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 repealed the Glass-Steagall wall between bank-
ing and commerce]. 
Id. 
163. Carrie Johnson, Businesses Prepare to Mount a Concerted Attack on Regula-
tion, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2007, at A02 (quoting David Chavern, U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce executive, in expressing industry concern that now is the time to 
“pick up [their] game” to avoid more stringent regulation in response to the current 
crisis). 
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V. REVISING EXPECTATIONS AND ADDRESSING MORAL HAZARD 
The first step in ending TBTF should be a clear, emphatic, and 
unequivocal statement from Congress, the FDIC, the Treasury Secre-
tary, the Federal Reserve, and the President that there will be no 
more rescue of financial institutions or other related entities based on 
TBTF.  Although this may be viewed as “closing the barn door after 
the horses are out,” the economy actually stands at an appropriate 
time for a firm forward-looking policy pronouncement.  As Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has publicly stated: “With the fi-
nancial turmoil abating, now is the time for policymakers to take 
action to reduce the probability and severity of any future crises.”164 
The imperative now is to counter expectations that the very larg-
est financial institutions are insulated from the consequences of their 
own mistakes and mismanagement.  “The role of expectations can 
hardly be overstated in the theory of moral hazard.”165  Government 
intervention may be justified in true emergency situations; however, 
it is the expectation of continued government bailouts that creates 
the most serious cases of moral hazard and distorted resource alloca-
tion. 
Once a public pronouncement has been made that TBTF will no 
longer be the controlling factor in government policy towards finan-
cial crisis, viable plans, market structures, and economic incentives 
must be in place, not only to prevent a relapse of this insidious doc-
trine, but also to engender belief going forward that bad management 
decisions166 resulting in insolvency will be punished in the market-
place, not rewarded by government.167  In September 2000, former 
  
164. Bernanke, supra note 157. 
165. Jörg Guido Hülsmann, The Political Economy of Moral Hazard, 2006 
POLITICKÁ EKONOMIE 35, 39 (Czech Rep.), available at http://www.vse.cz/polek/ 
abstrakt.php3?IDcl=544 (providing a concise discussion of moral hazard). 
166. See James Surowiecki, Too Dumb to Fail, NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 2008, at 
46, available at http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2008/03/31/080331ta_ 
talk_surowiecki (discussing the Bear Stearns rescue: “You might, then, see the 
Fed’s willingness to help investment banks as evidence of their indispensability.  
But what it really underscores is how badly Wall Street has managed its business 
in recent years.”). 
167. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Financial Gods That Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
21, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/21/opinion/21iht-edsamuelson.1. 
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President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Gary Stern analyzed the problem of “credibility” in convincing mar-
ket participants who have witnessed TBTF bailouts that TBTF will 
not be employed in the future.168  He identifies four strategies that 
merit consideration. 
First, Congress could pass legislation prohibiting bailouts, an op-
tion that “essentially requires regulators to ignore incentives to bail 
out creditors,” and is likely to be unsuccessful because policymakers 
have persuasive reasons to evade such a prohibition.169  Since flatly 
prohibiting TBTF bailouts is not a good answer, this article recom-
mends reducing the “too big” institutions themselves.  
Second, Congress could establish procedures that penalize regu-
lators for providing bailouts.170  Congress, through FDICIA, has al-
ready attempted to raise the cost to regulators of employing the sys-
temic risk exception to the “least cost resolution” mandate by requir-
ing public votes and Congressional accountability.171  In the throes 
of financial crisis, however, such costs are ineffective deterrents 
when weighed against incentives for the regulators to employ 
TBTF.172 
Third, measures such as requiring additional capital for large fi-
nancial institutions,173 or employing subordinated debt174 as a means 
  
7195844.html (“The late Milton Friedman must be rotating in his grave.  He had 
counseled firmly: Never, never bail out foolish people who have made grave, self-
harming mistakes.”). 
168. Gary H. Stern, Thoughts on Designing Credible Policies After Financial 
Modernization: Addressing Too Big to Fail and Moral Hazard, REGION (Fed. 




171. See discussion supra Part II. 
172. See generally Thorsten Beck, Deposit Insurance, Bank Resolution, and 
Lender of Last Resort—Putting the Pieces Together, in INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL INSTABILITY: GLOBAL BANKING AND NATIONAL REGULATION 299, 
303–04 (Douglas D. Evanoff et al. eds., World Scientific Studies in Int’l Econ., 
Vol. 2, 2007) (describing the motivation for regulators to postpone bank interven-
tions as “not on my watch,” a phrase that can also describe incentives to employ a 
TBTF bailout when the pressured atmosphere of the moment suggests that trigger-
ing a systemic meltdown could be the alternative). 
173. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 27, at 24.  
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of instilling market discipline and providing market signals regard-
ing the financial solvency and stability of large financial institutions, 
have been proposed and analyzed.  These recommendations can be 
valuable tools in a reform package, but they do not cut to the heart of 
the TBTF problem.  The current crisis spotlights the failure of a 
regulatory model that “promotes deregulation, reduced supervision 
and oversight, privatization, and consolidation of market power.”175  
Requiring increased capital and subordinated debt does not funda-
mentally change that model.  When they are adhered to, increased 
capital requirements may enhance the financial stability of large fi-
nancial institutions; however, such a regulatory mandate cannot cre-
ate capital for a troubled institution, nor can it necessarily prevent 
failures.  Recognizing that failures can and will occur, Congress 
should act to reduce the size and interconnectedness of financial in-
stitutions.176  Only if we change the structures which created the cur-
rent crisis can we change the outcome.177  
Fourth, the President and Congress could focus on policymakers 
themselves, appointing regulators who have the philosophical incli-
nation and the backbone to resist bailouts.178  A maxim of corporate 
culture change literature makes it clear that “[t]he best system or 
  
174. See, e.g., Robert R. Bliss, Market Discipline and Subordinated Debt: A Re-
view of Some Salient Issues, ECON. PERSP. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Chi. Ill.), 
First Quarter 2001, at 24; Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, Subordinated 
Debt and Prompt Corrective Regulatory Action (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., WP 
2003-03, 2003).  
175. Wray, supra note 162, at 1196. 
176. But see Too Big to Fail Hearing, supra note 51 (statement of Gary H. Stern, 
President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis). 
177. See Schwarcz, supra note 111, at 1129–30 (describing a similar problem 
with initial steps to address the financial crisis that focused exclusively on interest 
rate adjustments by central banks).  “In medical terms, it was as if a doctor were 
attempting to cure a patient by focusing on curing symptoms, not the underlying 
disease.”  Id. at 1130.  In this article’s analysis, inadequate capital is a symptom.  
Financial conglomerates that have been allowed to grow so large and so intercon-
nected that they continue to threaten the global economy are the disease. 
178. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 77, at 4 (“Appointment of leaders who are 
loath to, or at least quite cautious about, providing TBTF bailouts is also a concep-
tually simple but potentially helpful step.”). 
File: Graham Final.doc Created on:  3/19/10 2:49 PM Last Printed: 3/19/10 2:49 PM 
154 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 8, No. 2  
model in the world isn’t going to do your organization a bit of good 
unless you have a top-down commitment to making it work.”179 
VI. LAYING OUT THE GAME PLAN TO END TBTF 
The foregoing analysis focuses on the need for Congressional ac-
tion to end TBTF.  This government policy has sheltered large finan-
cial conglomerates from the consequences of their own disastrous 
decisions, at the expense of U.S. taxpayers and the U.S. economy.  
With vision and resolve, Congress can end TBTF and protect our 
financial system from key mistakes of the past.  This article makes 
the case for ending TBTF bailouts by reducing the size and intercon-
nectedness of large financial conglomerates.  Future research should 
explore mechanisms to:   
1.  Initiate size caps that limit continued expansion of finan-
cial conglomerates through internal growth and acquisitions.   
2.  End government-assisted acquisitions that allow the larg-
est institutions to grow even larger—at public expense. 
3.  Reinstate true firewalls between banking and com-
merce.180 
  
179. BEST PRACTICES IN LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATION 
CHANGE: HOW THE BEST COMPANIES ENSURE MEANINGFUL CHANGE AND 
SUSTAINABLE LEADERSHIP 46 (Louis Carter et al. eds., 2005). 
180. Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Paul Volcker supports re-
turning banks to their core deposit-taking and lending functions by prohibiting 
insured depository institutions from engaging in certain risky activities.  Dan 
Grebler, Volcker Urges Curbs on Big Banks’ Risky Trades, REUTERS, Feb. 2, 
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6112T320100202.  
The “Volcker Rule” places new limits on banks' ability to do proprietary trading, 
or buying and selling of investments for their own accounts unrelated to custom-
ers.  Id.  The “Volcker Rule” is supported by the Obama administration and five 
former Treasury Secretaries: Michael Blumenthal, Nicholas Brady, Paul O'Neill, 
George Shultz and John Snow.  Philip Barbara, Ex Treasury Secretaries Back 
Volcker Rule, REUTERS, Feb. 21, 2010, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61L0BB20100222?loomia_ow=t0:s0:a49
:g43:r1:c0.400000:b30845286:z0.  These activities restrictions would effectively 
limit the size and systemic risk of financial conglomerates.  Id.; see also Prohibit-
ing Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank Holding Compa-
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4.  Return to meaningful antitrust enforcement. 
5.  Immediately initiate reform measures such as increased 
capital for large institutions, subordinated debt requirements 
that enhance market discipline, enhanced systemic risk moni-
toring and regulation, and better advance planning for liqui-
dating large complex financial institutions. 
6.  As a longer term measure, commission a carefully re-
searched report on how to most effectively divide the exist-
ing conglomerates into manageable component parts that will 
no longer be “Too Big To Fail.” 
Ending TBTF will be no easy task.  Yet, the costs of doing noth-
ing to address the problem have proven devastating.  The U.S. finan-
cial system stands at a watershed. 
  
nies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 111th 
Cong. (2010) (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, President’s Economic 
Recovery Advisory Board), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index. 
cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=54b42cc0-7ecd-4c0d-88c0-
65f7d2002061&Witness_ID=091f5a89-dec4-4905-9fa1-678bfbec823a.  The main 
purpose of the “Volcker Rule” is to deal with the problem of TBTF.  Id. at 1. 
